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CONTRACTUAL JOINT RIGHTS AND DUTIES
IN KENTUCKY AND THE RESTATEMENT
Whether at common law several obligors under the same
instrument are bound jointly or severally, or jointly and sever-
ally, and whether a claim is owned by promisees jointly or sever-
ally, is a matter of intention to be determined largely by the
language used and the nature of the duty or duties owed. Thus
in the case of warranties and subscriptions where each warrants
for his own share or promises to pay a certain portion of a named
sum, the obligations are several only.'
1. SURVIVORSH=
(a) Joint Obligees.
Professor Williston has shown that the law of joint rights
and duties is derived from the law of joint tenancy in real prop-
erty.2  Thus where one joint obligee died the sole right of action
passed to the survivor.3 An early statute in Kentucky 4 provided
that on the death of one joint tenant his interest shall pass to his
representative the same as if the deceased and the survivor had
been tenants in common. This statute applies to the ownership
of joint obligations and the survivor must account to the repre-
sentative of the deceased after collection for the proportionate
share of the deceased as if he were a trustee, though he under the
earlier 5 law must sue alone. In (arneal's Heirs v. Day0 it was
'Evans v. Sanders, 10 B. Mon. 291 (Ky. 1850). In some cases
,the parties have all signed a single obligation describing themselves as
"trustee" "directors" etc., and the issue is whether they are liable only
as representatives, or are jointly and severally personally liable.
Whitney v. Sudduth, 4 Metc. 297 (1863); Ferguson v. True and Walker,
3 Bush 255 (1867); Pack v. White, 78 Ky. 243 (1880); MeKensey v.
Edwards, 88 Ky. 272 (1889). In Trask v. Roberts, 1 B. Mon. 201
(1841) all but one of such signers were made defendants. See Re.
statement Sec. 112, 115.
21 Williston on Contracts, See. 318.
3Brown v. King and Vance, 1 Bibb. 462 (1809); Morrison v.
Winn, Hardin 488 (1808). Such a right passes to the surviving part-
ner; McCulla v. Rigg, 3 A. K. Marsh, 259 (1821).
4Act of 1796-7 Sec. 2; 1 Bradford's Statutes 241; Morehead and
Brown Statute Law of Kentucky p. 318 (1834); Gillin v. Pence, 4 T.
B. Mon. 304 (1827). See also supplementary act of 1825, ib. p. 90.
"See cases in note 3 supra. Cf. Restatement Sec. 132.
'Litt. Sel. Cas. 492 (1821).
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declared that survivorship had been destroyed by a statute in
Virginia in 1786 (before the separation of Kentucky from Vir-
ginia), and that that statute had been later re-enacted in Ken-
tucky. The court held that the personal representative of a
deceased co-obligee was not a necessary party to the action either
at law or in equity, and that the survivor is a trustee quodam
modo. But the personal representative was regarded not an
improper party. In Perry & Minor v. Perry7 however, (decided
after the code was adopted in 1851) it was held that no longer
could the survivor sue alone, but the representative must join in
the action; and this result was necessitated by the "real party in
interest" provision of the Civil Code.8  A partnership interest
was said to be joint and all living partners must join in the
action.9
(b) Joint Obligors.
Prior to the statute permitting joinder of the representative
with the survivor it was held that the surviving obligor must be
sued alone by the obligee without joinder of the personal repre-
sentative of the deceased co-obligor and this was true though the
estate of deceased is by statute liable for a proportionate share.10
The liability of the representative became a several liability and
required a separate suit by the obligee.11 The rationale of this
view was expressed in Clark's Exr. v. Parish's Exr.12 as follows:
Suppose the action were one of debt, then, against the adminis-
trator one should declare in the detinet but one should declare in
the debet et detinet against the survivor. Also the general issue
would not be the same for the two defendants. One should plead
non debet and the other non detinet. Hence, the representative
must be sued separately, and the two actions may be brought
concurrently. By statute now all joint obligations are the joint
and several obligations of each obligor and all or any may be
T 16 Ky. Law Rep. 88 (1894).
"See. 18.
9jarman v. Howard, 3 A. K. Marsh. 383 (1820); Restatement Sec.
129.
1 "0lar 's Exrs. v. Parish's Errs., 1 Bibb. 547 (1809); Brown v.
King and Vance, supra n. 3, See Kentucky Civil Code Sec. 27. See
Restatement Sees. 125, 126.
nHead's Admrs. v. Oliver, 1 A. Marsh. 254 (1818). This was be-
fore the enactment of the Civil Code See. 27, old see. 39.
2Supra n. 10.
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sued at the option of the obligee' 3 and the representative of the
deceased obligor may be joined -with the survivor.
2. A PARTY IS BOTH PROMISOR AND PROMISEE IN THE SAE
CONTRACT.
Several instances have arisen in Kentucky where the obligor
or one of several co-obligors was also obligee or one of several
co-obligees. Since a man cannot be a debtor to himself, the
problem was, how is the transaction to. be regarded? X (who is
to be the party that is both obligor and obligee) can not be
plaintiff and at the same time be defendant.' 4 On the other,
hand, at common law all co-obligees should join in an action and
all co-obligors should be made defendants. It was also argued
that a discharge of one co-obligor worked a discharge of all the
rest. The court observed that the appointment of a co-obligor
as executorlof a deceased obligee would discharge the claim; and
that marriage is a release of the obligation previously existing
between the parties to it, but it was declared that these illustra-
tions were not parallel to the situation here arising.
The following were possible results:
i. The contract might fail entirely because a party can
not have a claim against himself. The alleged obligation pur-
ports to be joint and against all obligors as well as in favor of
all obligees." Since none other than a wholly joint obligation
was contemplated but in the form it appeared it was invalid, no
obligation was ever created.' 5
ii. An action might be brought in the name of all promisees
against all the named promisors. Thereafter,
(a) X might be entirely eliminated both as plaintiff and.
as defendant.16
sWaits v. McClure, 10 Bush 763 (1874).21See Clark on Code Pleading (1928) p. 135.
Cf. Al n v. Shadburne's Representatives, 1 Dana 68 (1833). This
is not unlike the argument used with respect to the creation or the
extinguishment of a trust. If the same person is made both trustee
and beneficiary no trust is created. If, however, after a valid trust
has been created, the beneficiary should later become trustee, equity
may in a proper case preserve the trust by preventing a merger. See
Evans, "The Termination of Trusts," 37 Yale L. Jour. 1070, 1093-1094,
1102 (1928).
"Quisenberry v. Artis, 1 Duv. 30 (1863) (action at law on a
note. This was after the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure).
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(b) There might be an abatement as to X in his capacity
as obligee or he might fail to join as plaintiff because when the
ambiguity in the instrument was explained it appeared that X
has no interest s promisee. If the interest in the obligation
was necessarily several though joint in form, it was declared
that there was no difficulty about joint covenantees suing sever-
ally. There seems to have been some evidence in one case that
the court clerk had inserted the name of one obligor in a bond,
as obligee, by mistake. 17
(c) There might be an abatement as to X in his capacity
as co-obligor where the ambiguity when shown and explained
indicated that X was a surety. He might thereafter proceed
against his co-obligor who was his principal.' 8
iii. Assume that as to the co-promisors the obligation was
joint. In form also it was joint as to the co-promisees but in real-
ity there was no community of interest among them. Each might
then have a several action. In Danieltv. Crooks,19 a bill in equity
was brought by a co-promisee on the theory that there was no
adequate remedy at law. The plaintiff assumed that at law all
co-promisees must be named as plaintiffs and all co-promisors
as defendants. Since there was an identity between two of the
defendants with the two co-promisors, it was also assumed that a
demurrer to the declaration would be sustained. The promise
was made by two stockholders in a bank, to all the stockholders
including themselves, to pay all the debts of the bank and redeem
at a named price all the stock. It was held that the rights of the
promisees were several and there was a complete remedy at law.
iv. Conversely, the interest of the co-promisees might be
in fact joint but the obligation of the co-promisors though joint
in form might be actually several. This several liability might
result from the statute.20
v. An obligation might be signed by a partnership in favor
of a menber of the firm. 21 In one case an action at law was
sustained by one as promisee against the other only, as a pro-
Cecil v. Laughlin, 4 B. Mon. 30 (1843) (covenant).
Debard v. Crow, 7 J. J. Marsh. 7 (1831).
"3 Dana 64 (1835). See Restatement See. 128 (1).2
'Allin v. Shadburne's Representatives, supra n. 15. Of. Morrison
v. Winn, supra n. 3.
2 Morrison v. Winn, supra n. 3. A partnership obligation is joint.
See Head's Advirs. v. Oliver, supra n. 11.
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misor.22  In Simrall v. O'Bannons23 however, where the action
was in equity, it was said that a partner could not thus sue a
partner at law, and that equity would make a decree with respect
to the rights of the promisee on the note only after there had
been an adjudication of the partnership affairs.
3. JOnDER OF PARTIES.
In harmony with the Restatement rule, 24 Kentucky held
prior to the Code that if o'nly some of the joint obligors were
joined as defendants, judgment must go against them unless they
pleaded that fact in abatement. A demurrer or a motion in
arrest of judgment should be overruled if it be for more defect
of parties defendant. 25 If the obligation were both joint and
several, distinct actions might be brought concurrently. 2 6 'Where
both joint obligors had been served with summons but only one
entered a plea, it has been held that at common law plaintiff
cannot dismiss the action as to the one only who did not plead,
!nd prosecute the action against the other.27 But if some of the
* co-obligor-defendants were infants or under any other personal
disability preventing them from binding themselves, as to such
the action might be dismissed and might be prosecuted against
the others. 28  Later by statute all obligationA which at common
law were joint, became both joint and several, and it became pos-
sible to sue one or some or all.29
Prior to the Code, if there were a defect of parties plaintiff,
advantage of it could be taken by demurrer or by motion to non-
suit,30 because the right, as in the case of a promise made to two
8xecutors, was joint and not joint and several, and a declaration
in the name of one if the proof showed an obligation running to
both, was a variance which was fatal. It was held that plaintiff
Morrison v. Stockwell's A.dmr., 9 Dana 172 (1839).
237 B. Mon. 608 (1847).
24 Sec. 117.
'Allin v. Lucket, 3 J. J. Marsh. 164 (1830); Tharp v. Farquar, 45
Ky. 3 (1845).
"2Sayre v. Coleman, 9 Dana 173 (1839). Cf. Restatement Sec. 114.
"lBurks v. Pointer, 1 B. Mon. 65 (1840); Restatement Sec. 118.
23Erwin v. Devine, 2 T. B. Mon. 124 (1825); Mcfilton et al v.
Commonwealth, 5 J. J. Marsh. 592 (1831); Elleage v. Bowman, 28 Ky.
593 (1831); Restatement See. 118 (c).
" Waits v. McClure, supra n. 13. See Kentucky Codes of Practice
by Johnson, Harlan and Stevenson (1854) Sec. 39.
: Allen v. Luckett, supra n. 25; Restatement Sec. 129. Now under
Sec. 92 (4) of the Code special demurrer is the proper procedure.
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must stand by the theory of his pleading and might be non-suited
unless he amended,3 1 because plaintiff had to prove the identical
contract sued upon in order that it might be a bar to another
action.
'Where several persons sign the same instrument, each bind-
ing himself for a fixed sum, the obligation is several.32  Suit at
common law must be several in such cases, and not joint.33 By
statute in Kentucky3 4 parties severally liable upon the same con-
tract, etc., may all or any of them, or the representatives of such
as may have died, be included in the same action at the plaintiff's
option. On the other hand, where the interest appears in form
to be joint, (that is, where several interests are evidenced by the
same instrument) but in fact is several, the various co-promisees
cannot join in a single action apart from an authorizing statute.
Thus, where a railroad company contracts by a single instrument
to carry the horses of various owners and the horses are injured
in a wreck, these owners must sue separately, as their interests
are separate.3 5 The court held that the real party in interest
statute made this result necessary. So too, the contract of a
railroad company to carry various persons in a special car and to
]hold the train for them for a given time at a named place, gives
a several interest to the various promisees, and they must sue
2Houngan v. Phillips, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 150 (1885); Gosso
v. Badgett, 6 Bush 97 (1869) Brown v. Warner 2 J. J. Marsh. 37 (1829).
See Restatement Sec. 129.
, Wilde & Co. v. Haycraft, 2 Duv. 309 (1865); Restatement Sec.
113.
"MoBean v. Todd, 2 Bibb 320 (1811).
"Hastings Industrial Co. v. Jones, 167 Ky. 714 (1916); Kentucky
Livestock Breeders Assn. v. Miller, 119 Ky. 393 (1905); Sec. 26 Civil
Code of Kentucky, old Sec. 38.
"Baughman v. L. & N. By. Co., 94 150, 31 S. W. 757 (1893).
The railroad company had contractd with one W who was agent for
the several owners to whom the horses belonged. The court said (a)
W could not have sued; (b) the owners need not all have sued to-
gether nor could they have sued together. The reason given is that
the "real party in interest" statute is in the way. It is not clear why
W could not have sued, since at common law the agent in whose name
the contract was made could sue on it. (See Mechem "Agency" Sec.
2022). The same is true under the interpretation of the "real party
in Interest" statute (Clark on Code Pleading page 128). Section 21
of the Kentucky Code provided that the 'real party in interest"
statute should not prevent an action by a person "in whose name a
contract has been made for the benefit of another." The conclusion that
the owners need not sue together was correct, but that they must
sue separately is an open question. (Clark on Code Pleading 253);
Restatement See. 128 (1).
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separateiy for a breach of the contract.3 6 In such cases a release
by one promisee cannot release the entire obligation.3 7  But the
interest of the various promisees cannot be both joint and several.
if by its nature the interest is joint but the promise is in the
alternative, it is a joint interest, and at common law all the
co-promisees must join.38  In Scott v. Colmesn'0 9 the obligee
sued defendant on what appeared on the face of the instrument
to be the sole obligation of the defendant. After judgment plain-
tiff discovered that there had been a dormant partner whom he
had overlooked and he proceeded by bill in equity against the
partner. The latter urged that by the judgment against his
partner he had been released. It was held that such an obliga-
tion, though joint at law, was joint and several in equity ;40 that
plaintiff had sued on a sole obligation only, without knowledge
that it was not what it appeared to'be, and could still have an
action in equity on the obligation as though it were several.
Conversely, where one makes what appears to be a joint promise
for himself and another without the authority of the other, he
becomes liable as if he alone in form had assumed the obliga-
tion41
In Garth v. Davis42 A and B each severally purchased cer-
tain lots at auction, the terms of sale providing for partial defer-
red payments. Prior to such purchase A and B had entered into
an oral agreement with each other by which they ivere to become
partners in the real estate business, and these purchases were to
be within the proposed business. The contract with each as
signed by the auctioneer was in form several. A joint deed was
tendered which they refused to accept, and the seller refused to
tender several con-yeyances and brought an action for specific
performance. The seller obtained a decree in his favor. Here
were contracts in form several, but they were treated as creating
a joint right,43 and are presumably several under the statute
only at the option of the obligee.
"Houthern Railroad Co. v. Marshal, 111 Ky. 560 (1901); Restate.
ment Sec. 128 (1).
2Blakey v. Blakey, 2 Dana 460 (1834).
"Burks v. Pointer, supra n. 27; Restatement Sec. 129.
"7 J. J. Marsh. 416 (1832).
10 See 1 Willlston on Contracts, Sec. 344.
Iacott V. Estill, 11 Ky. Op. 789 (1882).
427 Ky. Law Rep. 505 (1905).
"See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 306, 325 (top); Mechem on
Partnership (2nd ed. 1920) sees. 289, 292; 1 Mechem on Agency (2nd
ed. 1914) Sees. 182, 185.
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4. REDEASE AND ASSIGNmENT*
(a) Release.
In Fox v. Hudson's Exr, 44 one obligor in consideration of
the assignment of his property, was released. An accord and
satisfaction was reached and reservation was made of the claim
against X, the co-obligor. It was held that X also was released.
It is the general rule that a release by one co-obligee binds
his fellow;45 but if their interests are several though joint in
form, a release by one co-obligee does not bind his fellow. 46
A covenant not to "levy, exact or collect" a certain judgment
frome one of two judgment debtors is not a release in Ken-
tucky.47 Nor is an endorsement on a note made by a co-obligee
in favor of one co-obligor: "It is understood that B is. only
security of the "within note in case of failure of A" (the prin-
cipal), a release. So it was observed that a covenant not to
sue a several obligor for a limited time or never to sue a joint-
obligor, was not to be construed as a release.4 8
Suppose A, B and C indorse jointly a negotiable instrument
which the maker later dishonors; the holder thereupon gives
notice to one of them, but not to the others. Since the others
are released, is there any effect to be given to the notice to the
one ? Kentucky holds that he is bound, and that the only way
he can have the right of contribution, is himself to give the
notice to the co-indorsers. 49 Of course, there is no way by which
*On assignment generally in Kentucky, see 18 Ky. L. Jour. 242
(1930).
"150 Ky. 115, 150 S. W. 49 (1912); Restatement Sec. 120.
"Allin v. Slhadburne's Representatives, supra n. 15; Clark v.
Parish, supra n. 10; Restatement Sec. 130 (a).
" Blaey v. Blakey, supra n. 37. (It was- also held that if only
two are named as obligors in the body of the bond, but the bond is
signed by three, all three are joint obligors.) See Restatement Sec.
123.
'
7Mason v. Jouett's Admr., 2 Dana 107 (1834); Restatement Sec.
121 (2).
4'Lane and Taylor v. Owings, 3 Bibb. 247 (1813).
"Williams v. Paintsville National Bank, 143 Ky. 781, 137 S. W.
555, Ann. Cas. 1912D 350 (1911); Doherty v. First National Bank of
Louisville, 170 Ky. 810, 186 S. W. 137 (1916). This result is required by
Section 68 of the Negotiable Instruments Law as to "joint payees orjoint indorsees who indorse" for the statute says they "are deemed to
indorse jointly and severally." In both of the Kentucky cases supra
the indorsers were payees, but the language in the cases makes no
requirement that they be such. The reason for such a view has been
Pointed out in Case v. McKinnis, 106 Or. 71,' 213 Pac. 422 (1923) and
Brannan has more recently pointed out that the basis for such a view
has now been removed in Kentucky. Brannan's Negotiable Instru-
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he can certainly inform himself whether notice has been sent to
the others, and to be obliged to inquire puts as much of a burden
upon him as is the burden to give the notice.
(b) Assignment by the Obligee to a Co-obligor.
In Kouns v. Bank of Kentucky 50 B was surety for A on a
bond payable to C and judgment had been rendered against the
two. A's property was levied on and he replevied it, giving K
as surety on the replevin bond. B paid the original debt there-
after, and took an assignment of the judgment against A and
himself. B, acting through C, proceeded to sue on the replevin
bond signed by K as surety for A. The defense of K was that
B, having been discharged from liability in the original judg-
ment by his settlement with C, A was discharged. If A was dis-
charged there was no longer any validity to the replevin bond.
Another question arose as to the effect of the giving of a replevin
bond by' A in which B did not concur. The acceptance of the
bond was held to be a release of B and the original judgment
obligation was now merged into this new obligation, but that
there was nothing to prevent B (since he apprehended though
mistakenly, his own continuing liability on the judgment) from
purchasing the judgment without releasing the co-obligor. It
may be said therefore, that payment by the surety, of a: joint
judgment against himself and his principal may have the effect
of an assignment of the claim to the paying co-obligor together
with such additional security as the obligee may have had-a
case of subrogation.
ments Law (4th Ed.) 629, 689. The Negotiable Instruments Law how-
ever, provides notice to one partner is notice to the firm (See. 99)
and the Kentucky Court had so held prior to the adoption of the
Statute. Hays v. Citizens Having Bank, 101 Ky. 201, 40 S. W. 573
(1897); Restatement Sec. 116.
102 B. Mon. 303 (1842). Kentucky once followed the practice of
permitting the judgment debtor to "replevy the execution." See
Jackson v. Speed, 3 3. J. Marsh 56 (1829); Caldwell v. Cook, 5 Litt.
180 (1824); Crawford v. Diuncan, 7 Ky. Law Rep. 134 (1885); Coburn
v. Currens, 64 Ky. 242 (1866); Gibson v. Pew, 3 J. J. Marsh. 222 (1830);
Millar v. Field, 3 A. K. Marsh. 104 (1820); Anderson v. Bradford, 5 J.
J. Marsh. 69 (1830) ; Snider v. Armendt, 105 Ky. 317, 49 S. W. 10 (1899).
In Wilziamson v. Ringold, 4 Cranch 39 (U. S. 0. C. for D. C. 1830) the
court said: "The motion for a return upon the ground that goods in
the custody of the law are not to be replevied is, in effect, a motion to
quash the replevin; for if the return should be ordered it should be
without bond; and such an order would be of course, if the plaintiff
In replevin were the debtor, in the writ of fieri facias, for the law in
that respect is well sdttled in this country and in England." Such
practice is no longer followed. See Carroll's Civil Code of Kentucky
(1927) Sec. 1815.
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In whatever way we may regard the alleged merger of the
judgment obligation in the replevin bond, it seems clear that
payment of the judgment by a surety entitles him to recover the
entire obligation from his principal. The obligation of the prin-
cipal to the surety( after the latter has paid) is a different one
from the joint obligation of principal and surety to the original
creditor. The taking of an assignment from the obligee has the
appearance of keeping alive the original obligation of the non-
paying co-obligor for the benefit of the paying co-obligor-
assignee.
Professor Williston suggests51 that if the paying co-obligor
is a surety, equity should keep alive the obligation of the non-
paying co-obligor, subrogating the surety to the advantages of
the obligee. When there has been any pledgd by way of col-
lateral or otherwise, there is an obvious advantage in this way
of proceeding. If there were no such security given by the
principal, it seems difficult to see why the surety co-obligor who
pays should have any other right than that of indemnification.
There are however, three situations; (a) as above, a surety-
co-obligor pays the whole debt and claims to recover against the
principal;52 (b) a surety co-obligor pays and seeks to recover
against the co-surety, and (c) a co-obligor principal pays the
whole and seeks to recover a moiety against the other co-prin-
cipal.
Smithz v. Latimer5 3 was a case of the first type. The
co-obligor-assignee made an agreement with the obligee-assignor
whereby he reserved the right to sue his co-obligor in the name
of the assignor. The court said that plaintiff had a right of
action for contribution; that the surety had a remedy even
without an agreement with the payee, and that the agreement
operated to indicate that there was no intent to release the
defendant. The transaction occurred prior to the enactment of
the real party in interest statute. In Logan C unty National
Bank v. Barclay,5 4 which was subsequent to that statute, the
plaintiff seems to have followed the pleadings in the prior case
without understanding the basis of the relief granted. The origi-
nal obligation of A and B to C bank, which seems to have been of
II Williston on Contracts, Sec. 1267. See also See. 1271.
=Roberts v. Bruce, 12 K. L. R. 932, 15 S. W. 872 (1891).15 B. Mon. 75 (1854).
104 Ky. 97 (1898).
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the third type, was assigned by C bank the obligee, to the firm B
and D. By a second assignment, the instrument came into the,
hands of X. X then brought an action in his own name and in
the names of C, B and D. It was held that the claim against A
was discharged because by assignment B was discharged and
that as B had made no reservation of a right to sue A (in the
name of C) such right did not exist, thus distinguishing this case
from Smith v. Latimer.5 5 Formally, so far as C bank is con-
cerned the claim was extinguished, but X should have the right to
contribution which had been assigned to him by B who (in pur-
chasing the claim from C) paid the original debt and was entitled
to sue in quasi-contract for contribution. In Smith v. Latimer
the court recognized the right of contribution without any agree-
ment but recovery was had on the theory of assignment which
meant subrogation.5 6
When the joint obligor who pays can obtain no additional
security, it is bad theory from which no practical advantage can
acrue for him to attempt to retain the original cause of action
instead of claiming contribution or indemnification. In Logan
County Bankd v. Barclay 57 the court says that in Smith v. Lati-
mer s it was held that "one of several joint or joint and several
obligors may pay off the note and by agreement with the obligee,
reserve the right to sue the other joint and several obligors at
law in the name of the obligee upon the note. In the case at bar
51Supra n. 53.
5 Even though a joint and several obligation is discharged by pay-
ment by one co-obligor who is then released, it does not follow that
he has no remedy against the obligor who did not pay. If the one who
paid was a surety, he should recover the entire claim against the
principal. If he were a joint principal obligor he, having shared the
consideration, should have a right to contribution. Morris v. Evans,
2 B. lon. 84 (1841); Logan County N~ational Bank v. Barclay, supra
n. 54. If he were a co-surety, he should also have a right of contribu-
tion against his co-surety. If he were the sole principal he of course,
should have no claim against his co-obligor.
We may raise two questions as to the assignment-subrogation
doctrine. Should equity keep such a claim alive under the doctrine of
subrogation when no' advantage can accrue over an action at law for
indemnification or contribution? Secondly, should a joint-principal
have a right to be subrogated under the guise of an assignment whether
or not -any advantage can accrue from this method of procedure. It
would seem that this theory had given the unjustifiable impression
in the Logan County Bank case that the paying co-obligor principal
had no remedy if he had not taken the precaution to procure an assign-
ment.
ITSupra n. 54.
"Hupra n. 53.
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it is not pretended that one of the obligors paid the note off and
reserved the right to sue in the name of the obligee, but the alle-
gation is that the note was sold and delivered after maturity to
Ryan and Barclay, not that it was paid off by Barclay as surety,
and the note taken reserving the right to sue in the name of the
obligee." It was held that the non-paying co-obligor was released
here and that there could be no recovery by the assignee. Had
it not been for the confusion of theory plaintiff might have had
indemnification or contribution.
In another case where the surviving co-obligor had paid the
joint judgment and sued the administrator of the deceased
co-debtor for contribution, it was held that the defendant might
plead that he had already paid the debt and had already defeated
an action against himself on the same note under plea of pay-
ment.59 It was also declared that plaintiff was not in the posi-
tion of an assignee.60
Summary: The common law rule as to survivorship of
joint rights and joint duties was modified by an early statute in
Kentucky. Prior to the real party in interest statute, the repre-
sentative of the deceased party however, need not be a party and
at first it was held he must not be. After that statute he became
a necessary party plaintiff. If deceased were a co-obligor the
representative might be joined as defendant. An early statute
also converted all joint obligations into joint and several obliga-
tions and the necessary result as to joinder of parties follows.
A rather strange phenomenon appeared in this state, to-wit:
a party appearing on the same instrument as both obligor or
co-obligor and obligee or co-obligee. The court has usually deter-
mined the factual situation and then allowed the action to pro-
ceed according to that determination. These are all older cases
however, and the problem may not arise in the future.
Kentucky agrees with the Restatement with respect to the
effect of a release and of a covenant not to sue one of several
co-obligors. Along with the cases however, where one co-obligor
paid and caused a release of the original obligation, are several
cases where the paying (presumably in full) co-obligor has pur-
ported to take an assignment of the obligation to himself aceom-
Thomas v. Thomas, 2 J. J. Marsh. 60 (1829).
I The obligee of an obligation which is joint, cannot assign his
Interest in the claim against one co-obligor and retain it against the
other. See Lyon v Lyon, 4 Bibb 438 (1816).
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panied by an agreement with the assignor that he may sue in the
latter's name. Through a misunderstanding of the rights
involved it has occasionally been held that if such a right is not
reserved there can be no recovery against the principal or
co-surety in such cases. These are likewise not late 'cases and
the problem may not arise again.** ALvnx E. EvAxs.
**The writer acknowledges valuable suggestions from his colleague,
Mr. George Ragland, Jr.
